Fortunately, the same instrument that had brought about the demise of the balloon bow provided a replacement: the fixed wing aircraft. Although the Wright brothers had first flown in 1903 and the US Army had bought its first airplane in 1909, by the end of World War I it had had 39 aerosquadrons in action against the enemy. They had performed "pursuit" (fighter), bombardment and observation missions, all of primitive type, using mostly open cockpit biplanes.

But enough had been learned to make it clear that the fixed wing aircraft (helicopters were way in the future) was the device to develop. When the Army Air Corps was created by Act of Congress in 1926, it began to develop specialized types of aircraft to perform its several functions. For observation a tandem two-seater, open cockpit biplane was generally used. Rather heavy, it required a hard surface runway or its near equivalent. The Air Corps furnished the plane and pilot for observation of artillery fire while the field artillery furnished the observer. Doctrine specified that such observation planes should be attached to corps and from there allotted to subordinate units on a mission-by-mission basis as the situation dictated.

The two branches quickly worked out a suitable technique. During 1930 to 1932, at Ft. Bliss, TX, the duties of the reconnaissance officer of the 82nd Field Artillery Battalion (Horse) of the 1st Cavalry Division included those of battalion air observer. The observers went aloft in an Air Corps plane and adjusted artillery fire during target practice at the Dona Ana Firing Range in New Mexico. Adjustments were routinely rapid and accurate, though slowed somewhat by the use of Morse code instead of radio telephone.

But, however adequate the technique, there were serious and fatal flaws in the arrangement just described. The plane furnished was always a fairly heavy type requiring a hard surface runway or near equivalent; it therefore had to be based at an airport or temporary field some distance to the rear, "on call." When the call for aerial support was made, the pilot had first to find the artillery unit that was to serve, since the artillery often had moved since the last mission.

The observer, whether Field Artilleryman or Air Corps observer, was likewise in the dark as to gun position and target location; this had to worked out by radio after the plane was airborne. As an alternate situation, the observer could be stationed between missions at the guns, and thus have all the information he needed, but the delay due to his travel overland from guns to airfield to begin the mission was unacceptable.

All this was well-known to every artilleryman and much complaining was done, but little else. In 1939 war broke out in Europe, and by 1940 military activity in the United States was increasing by leaps and bounds, and it seemed likely that the United States would eventually be drawn in. A need for an operational requirement and the search for a solution for better air observation grew in intensity, led by chief of Field Artillery, Major General Robert M. Danford. The potential requirement attracted the attention of the three leading light aircraft manufacturers; Aeronca, Piper, and Taylorcraft. Aggressive businessmen, they got into the act and placed one or more civilian aircraft with company pilots, at the disposal of every senior commander in large scale Army maneuver divisions.

"J-3 Piper Cub Observation Plane"
Early in July 1941 the entire 1st Cavalry Division Division was assembled at Ft. Bliss for the first time and an era of intensive wartime maneuvers was inaugurated in preparation for possible war. These maneuvers provided the Division a first hand opportunity to participate in the early tactical evaluations of the military use of light aircraft for artillery fire control and troop reconnaissance. Successful field results with the light planes gained new supporters for their continued use in future maneuvers, two being the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, Major General Innis Palmer Swift and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Joseph M. Swing.

Later in the year, in the second 3rd Army LOUISIANA MANEUVERS (05 August to 08 October), the War Department approved the trial use of light planes for "control of troop movements, scout, patrol, drop bombs, ferry personnel, carry messages, and observe artillery fire". At his own expense, William T. Piper Sr., supplied eight new J-3 Cub airplanes equipped with radios, and a contingent of factory pilots and mechanics. This civilian fleet, called "Grasshoppers", operating through the trying days of the summer and fall maneuvers, proved the flexibility and capability of the light planes to be much more effective than the larger planes used for the same purposes. The After Action reports on the maneuvers called for the investigation of their continued use.

"Piper L-4A Grasshopper"
On 06 June 1942, following a final series of experiments with organic Army spotter aircraft, the Secretary of War ordered the establishment of organic air observation for field artillery. The L-4A liaison aircraft, originally designated the O-59, became the military version of the famous Piper J3 "Cub." The Army ordered the first O-59s in 1941 for tests in conjunction with its growing interest in the use of light aircraft for liaison and observation duties in direct support of ground forces.

Subsequently, the adaptation of aerial technology allowed the 1st Cavalry Division to enter World War II with another discipline in its inventory of weapons. Throughout the war, and for several years after, Army aviation was called organic Army aviation. This was done to distinguish it from the Army Air Force and because its aircraft and personnel were organic to battalions, brigades, and divisions of the Army Ground Forces. This capability would be enhanced and improved leading to its later use in the organization of the 1st Cavalry Division Aviation Brigade, a major maneuvering unit that, today, changes the way that wars are fought.

The original function of organic Army aviation during World War II was to assist in the adjustment of artillery fire. During the course of the war, however, organic aviation's small fixed-wing aircraft, commonly known as Grasshoppers, came to be used for Command and Control (C2), medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), wire laying, courier service, aerial photography, reconnaissance, and other purposes. The principal reason for the expanding mission of organic Army aviation was that its aircraft were accessible to ground commanders and able to operate in close coordination with ground forces. The aircraft of the Army Air Forces often were not.

Both the original creation of organic Army aviation and its assumption of additional functions during World War II provoked friction and rivalry between the Army Ground Force and the Army Air Force. When the Army Air Force became the US Air Force in 1947 and organic Army aviation remained part of the Army, the friction continued and lasted until the 1970s. To avoid the expense of having two aviation organizations with overlapping functions, the War Department and later the Department of Defense (DOD) established restrictions on the roles and missions of Army aviation and on the size and type of Army aircraft.

For essentially the same reason, Army aviation's primary training and the development and procurement of its aircraft were controlled by the Army Air Force/US Air Force for many years. These restrictions were specified in a series of War Department and DOD memoranda and by agreements between the Army and the Air Force that began in 1942 and continued until 1975. Notwithstanding the continuing restrictions on the roles and missions of Army aviation, its actual functions in combat situations continued to expand during the Korean and Vietnam wars, for essentially the same reasons as during World War II.

Concurrently, Army aviation progressively became independent of the Air Force in matters of training, procurement, and logistics. Army aviation thereby evolved from a small organization with a limited combat support mission to become the principal air arm of the Army. Its expanding mission and responsibilities were reflected in the successive memoranda and agreements - usually negotiated after the exigencies of combat or extensive testing had clearly demonstrated that Army aviation was the logical provider of most of the Army's tactical aerial requirements.

Although Army aviation has continued to use some fixed-wing aircraft up to the present, its evolution to its current role and status resulted to a large degree from the development of the helicopter and of rotary-wing tactics and doctrine. While the Army Air Forces, the Navy, and the Coast Guard acquired helicopters during World War II, Army aviation did not acquire its first one until 1947. The helicopter was in its infancy during that period, however, and, aside from a very few rescue missions, was used only for testing, experimentation, and training. The Army Ground Forces, to which Army aviation was then attached, borrowed a helicopter from the Army Air Forces and conducted tests at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, beginning in 1944; however, no requirement for Army Ground Forces helicopters was established by those tests.

During the early years of the Cold War, the Army Air Forces/US Air Force gave greater emphasis than ever to strategic air operations and correspondingly less emphasis to tactical air support of the Army. The Air Force continued using the helicopter almost exclusively for search-and-rescue operations, reluctant to allocate resources even for testing helicopters for other purposes. The Navy and Coast Guard also continued to use rotary-wing aircraft only for rescue and other similar purposes. Both the Army and the Marine Corps, however, became interested in acquiring helicopters for other uses - especially in view of the growing Army perception that the Air Force had very little interest in tactical transport and close air support (CAS).

In 1946, the War Department Equipment Board determined that Army Ground Forces required four types of helicopters. The types ranged from light liaison to transport helicopters capable of carrying one to three tons and convertible to cargo, passenger, or ambulance use. Three years later, another Army board study expanded these requirements to six types with cargo capacities of up to 25 tons.

"Bell H-13 Souix Helicopter"
Because of the shortage of helicopters and the reluctance of the US Air Force to purchase them for the ground forces, the Army did not acquire its first helicopter, an experimental model of the two-place H-13 Sioux, until 1947. Following initial testing of this aircraft, the Army requested authorization to purchase 150 more and recommended the early development and acquisition of cargo helicopters. The Army was able to acquire a total of only 74 H-13 observation helicopters during the following three years, however, and did not acquire its first cargo/utility helicopter until 1952.

Helicopters were in short supply during the early years of the Korean war. In addition to this fact, the Air Force was slow about testing them and resisted procuring them for the Army. When Major General James M. Gavin requested helicopters from the director of requirements for the Air Force, he was told that "the helicopter is aerodynamically unsound... and no matter what the Army says, I know that it does not need any."

Korean War

During the Korean war, the Army used fixed-wing aircraft for essentially the same functions as during World War II. However, the inception of organic Army Aviation emerged during the Korean War with the growing realization that ground commanders needed aviation resources directly under their control which were always responsive to his needs as an integral part of the organizational assets. More importantly, the war in Korea clearly demonstrated the potential of the helicopter, especially for MEDEVAC and tactical transportation. Although the Army was not able or prepared to employ helicopters for other missions during that period, the Marine Corps successfully demonstrated the value of the helicopter in "vertical envelopment operations" - an early version of air mobility and air assault.

Army Aviation as a separate organizational unit came into being in the period of 1950 to 1954. By January 1953, four transportation helicopter companies, later designated as aviation units, had been organized and a number of provisional ambulance detachments were operational. Both during and following the Korean war, several Army leaders called for the use of helicopters in new tactical missions. General Gavin published an influential article in April 1954, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses." The article called for the use of helicopters in air cavalry operations to provide the mobility that Army cavalry forces had lacked in Korea. Much of the conceptual basis for doctrinal development of the helicopter during the 1950s came from General Gavin's vision of a "sky cavalry" unit.

On 15 February 1954, the third year after the return of the 1st Cavalry Division to Hokkaido, Japan, a new dimension was added to the intensive troop training program of the First Team when "F" Company, 5th Cavalry Regiment took to the sky in a tactical airlift training operation. Using a system of shuttle flights, H-19 helicopters from the 6th Helicopter Company, transported the soldiers from their home base of Camp Schimmelpfennig to the training area of Ojoji-hara, some thirty miles away. Immediately upon arrival, the troopers, clad in overwhites, moved out with complete field gear, and set up winter training operations.

Later in 1954, the United States Army Aviation School moved from Camp Sill, Oklahoma, to Camp Rucker, Alabama. Camp Rucker was renamed Fort Rucker and the United States Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC) was established there the following year. In 1956, the Aviation School began mounting weapons on helicopters and developing air cavalry tactics which may have not been in total conformity with DOD restrictions on the use of Army aircraft assets. To circumvent any possible objections, the School indicated that they were experimenting with the arming of helicopters under the auspices of an Army directive to develop "highly mobile task forces with an improved ratio of fire power to manpower."

Return to the DMZ

"H-37 Heavy Lift Helicopters"
By the end of 1960, the basic objective of the Army's air mobility program was that each division would have the capability of moving at least one company of infantry by organic airlift. In 1962, the 1st Cavalry Division was the first division to be totally equipped with Huey helicopters for "dust off" medical evacuations. In the spring of 1963, units received H-19, H-21 and H-37 helicopters and extensive air assault familiarization and training was conducted. In order to recruit potential helicopter pilots, personnel records were pulled to determine individual results of initial induction testing. All troopers who had scored well were asked to volunteer for helicopter training. After passing a flight physical, all who volunteered (regardless of time remaining on their tour of duty) were transferred to Fort Rucker, Alabama for pilot training.

Vietnam War

In 1963, under the Reorganizational Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) concept, the divisional companies were expanded into battalions consisting of a general support company and an airmobile company. The general support companies assumed the aerial surveillance, reconnaissance and liaison and utility missions of the old divisional aviation companies while the airmobile companies augmented with armed escort helicopters, performed the mission of air movement of troops and material. The Air Assault Division was established in 1963 to test the ideas developed in the previous year by the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (or Howze Board, named after its president, Lt. General Hamilton H. Howze).

Ultimately, only two divisions, operated tactically under the Airmobile concept. The 11th Air Assault Division was inactivated in 1965 and the 1st Cavalry Division along with the 101st Airborne Division were reorganized, with organic aviation groups of three battalions of rotary-wing aircraft and a fixed wing aviation company. This beginning had an enormous impact on the expansion of Army Aviation that took place during the Vietnam War.

The aviation element assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division, the 11th Aviation Group (Airmobile) consisted of the 227th, 228th, 229th Aviation Battalions and the 1st Squadron (Reconnaissance), 9th Cavalry Regiment. The first of the contingent arrived in Vietnam on 13 September 1965. The 11th Aviation Group was soon operating at full capacity and its missions of providing tactical mobility for combat troops and transporting equipment and supplies to units of the division.

The original method of operation of the 1st Cavalry Division was that only two brigades would be deployed in the field at a time an the other would remain at the base camp. For the most part, the 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB) supported the 3rd Brigade and the 229th (AHB) supported the 1st Brigade and both battalions shared in the support of the 2nd Brigade. The 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion (ASHB) was employed in general support of the Division. The mission of 11th General Support Aviation Company was to furnish aviation support for the Division Headquarters and other units within the Division without organic aircraft. The group and its subordinate units soon proved to be able to provide continuous support (day or night) during marginal visual and weather conditions.

"Air Insertion Operation"
The uniquely high demands placed upon aviation resources by the nature of the operations in Vietnam led to the constitution and activation of a large number of nondivisional battalions to supplement aviation resources organic to the division. The search for the ideal combination of resources and mission requirements led to the formation of the 9th (Air) Cavalry Brigade during the final phases of the Vietnam War. Although short lived, the success of the unit stimulated the continuance of air mobile concepts through the next decade.

Armed scout and attack helicopters - especially when operating in nap-of-the-earth and nighttime environments - clearly were shown to have the required survivability and to be viable and essential elements of conventional mid-to high-intensity warfare. Thus the way was paved for the continued development of the modern attack and scout helicopters and the doctrinal principles that would take Army aviation into the next century.

In Readiness

With the return of the last elements of the Aviation Operations to Fort Hood in 1972, The units underwent several reorganizations and the aviation operations became centralized under the command of a "Provisional" Brigade in 1974. Out of this test operation, the Combat Aviation Brigade was constituted in the Regular Army and activated at Fort Hood, Texas on 01 September 1984 under the command of Colonel Robert A. Goodbary. At that time the brigade was composed of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, the 227th Aviation and the 228th Attack Helicopter Battalions. The two aviation battalions combined with the reconnaissance squadron of the 9th Cavalry, gave the Combat Aviation Brigade its scout, observation, attack and support capability.

The mission of the newly formed Aviation Brigade was to find, fix and destroy enemy forces using reconnaissance, fire and maneuver capability to concentrate and sustain combat power at the critical time and place. The brigade provides timely reconnaissance and intelligence throughout the battlefield, mass attack helicopter fires and rapidly reposition combat power anywhere within the division area. It is capable of quickly inserting troops, supplies and equipment to sustain the battle and at the same time provide the command, control and liaison assets necessary to manage and coordinate the battle.

Persian Gulf War, Southwest Asia

"USNS Capella, RollOn RollOff Vessel"
On 07 August 1990, an alert to deploy for Southwest Asia operations as part of the joint forces participating in Operation Desert Shield was issued to the Aviation Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division. The focus at that time was the defense of Saudi Arabia against potential Iraqi attack. Plans calling for the division to deploy by 15 September extended the work day to 14, 16 and in some cases 24 hours. On schedule, by mid September heavily loaded vehicles and aircraft were loaded at the Fort Hood railhead to make the trip to the seaports of Houston and Beaumont, Texas. Additional vehicles formed road conveys that left every two hours, around the clock.

On 16 September, an Air Force C5A Galaxy, carrying the advanced headquarters staff, left Fort Hood Robert Gray Army Airfield. In the final drama, soldiers assembled for manifest roll call. The moment came; busses pulled up, planes were loaded and the time for memories had begun. On 28 September, personnel of the Aviation Brigade flew to Dharhan, Saudi Arabia.

"Theater of Operations"
Between 30 September and 10 October, the Brigade off loaded equipment at the Port of Ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia and prepared for operations. On 10 October, the Brigade moved 165 km Southwest into the desert and deployed to Assemble Area, "Horse". On 30 October, the Brigade began familiarization and crew training to adjust to the Saudi Arabian desert environment. Special emphasis was placed on night proficiency. Flight training continued into November, changing emphasis to team and company drills. Plans and rehearsals for the defense of Saudi Arabia were developed and constantly refined.

On 11 January 1991, beginning to focus on offensive action, the 1st Battalion moved Northwest to Tactical Assembly Area Wendy, located in the vicinity of King Khalid Military City (KKMC). On 13 January, ARCENT attached the 1st Cavalry to the VII Corps control. The First Team was ordered into defensive positions along the South of the Tapline Road. The defense consisted of the 1st Brigade covering the area West of the Wadi, the 2nd Brigade covering east of the Wadi and 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry screening forward, behind the Tapline Road. For the 1st Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment the war began during the day, on 17 January, in an attack against 50 Iraqi tanks crossing the border into Saudi Arabia. Shortly after departure, the mission was scrubbed without any direct engagement. The Iraqi tanks had defected. Positioned at Assembly Area Wendy, plans for the defense of Wadi al Batin and areas north of Tapline Road were refined.

On 23 January, the 1st Cavalry Division began their methodical "creep" forward toward the border with the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry moving their ground and aerial screens. Their efforts were rewarded by the capture of the 1st defector. The final week of February was characterized by intense vehicle maintenance and unit training in preparation for the ground phase. On 01 February, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry began pushing a platoon out to observe the Ruqi Highway as the Saudi border guards began their withdraw from their posts. In further preparation, on 04 February, Hellfire gunnery was conducted at night on the Jayhawk Range.

On 05 February, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry reported nine vehicles moving North, in front of the screen. An AH-1 Cobra Helicopter, on the screen, received small arms fire from dismounts near a desert observation post. The Cobra returned fire with five rockets, scoring two direct hits.

On 10 February, the 1st Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment moved North of Hafar al Batin to Assembly Area Bart. Although plans had been made to conduct screen operations, none were flown as part of the 1st Cavalry Division's plan of deception to conduct a "feint" attack up the Wadi al Batin, creating the illusion that it was the main ground attack of the Allies. Crew chiefs went to work by flashlight to ready the helicopters that would fly into killing range of the Iraqi 27th and 28th Infantry Divisions. After being postponed three times, the Battalion launched early in the damp, cold dawn of 25 February without close air support. The mission was composed of sixteen AH-64's to concentrate fire power on the prime target areas.

"AH-64 Cockpit Night Vision Display"
Passing over the berm and over the 2nd Brigade, the pilots could make out tankers below waving and cheering the "tank killers" on. Moments later, eight Iraqi solders held up tattered white flags. Bravo Company's "Grim Reaper" scouts landed their OH-58's to watch them until members of the 2nd Brigade could round them up and collect them. Meanwhile, the Battalion was hitting the enemy hard, destroying tanks, trucks, mortar and artillery pieces, fuel tankers and soldiers.

As the fire escalated, a radio call froze everyone for an instant. "We're hit, we're hit, we're going down". It was the Commander of Charlie Company, Captain Mike Klingele. Their wingman, 1st Lt. Robert Johnston, saw the crash and suppressed the enemy who had already began to move in on the wreck. Captain Klingele and his crewman CWO Mike Butler were able to free themselves from the cockpit and began to run towards Johnston's ship. Johnston took off with the two hanging by a strap attached to the pylons. The Iraqis, fearing the main effort was about to be launched, set fire trenches ablaze in front of the 2nd Brigade. The smoke, combined with the uncertain tactical situation, made a recovery of the AH-64 by a CH-47 Chinook too risky. The downed helicopter was destroyed in place with two TOW missiles.

The Battalion regrouped and made two more runs against the Iraqis before they were relieved by the 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment. The tally for the day was thirty one bunkers, one tank, three howitzers, five trucks, a radar site and two grateful survivors.

On 26 February, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry led the 1st Cavalry north into Iraq after hastily terminating the screening operations. On 27 February, the 1st Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment Battalion moved North across the Saudi Arabia - Iraq border as an element of the ground war. Aircraft stopped to refuel at Objective Lee, then continued Northeast in Iraq to Assembly Area John. Upon arrival the aircraft remained in standby and were not committed to battle. On 28 February, the ground elements of the 227th closed with the aircraft when the 48 hour cease fire went into effect. As the sun rose over the silent battlefield, the Aviation Brigade found itself squarely in the middle of the Tawakalna's former sector. The sand was laced with unexploded cluster munitions from the intense campaign against the Republican Guard.

On 04 March, a thorough battle assessment was conducted. As part of the clean up operations, two OH-58's, equipped with loud speakers, along with AH-64 helicopters swept a large area of Southern Iraq evaluating battle damage using gun cameras to record the wreckage. The mission also uncovered several Iraqi soldiers left behind in the retreat of the Republican guard.

On 09 and 10 March, the Brigade supported demolition operations of abandoned equipment and undamaged Iraqi equipment. The 1st Cavalry moved south into Saudi Arabia and the new Assembly Area (AA) Killeen. There on the plain of the Wadi al Batin - the Cavalry began to prepare for redeployment home.

"First Team Persian Gulf Color Guard"

Today's Cavalry